This article situates analysis of French macroeconomic policy developments under surpluses. Yet, time is an important factor in politics, and these corrosive tendencies are unlikely to generate a change in the Franco-German relation during Hollande's Presidential tenure.
Introduction
Economic policy under Hollande's presidency needs to be understood in the context the politics of macroeconomic policy for advanced European economies in a post-Bretton Woods order where policy autonomy is limited. Below we set out how European economic integration emerged as a response to post-Bretton Woods US hegemony and monetary power, and how, within European monetary integration, German monetary power shaped the economic policy choices faced by governments. This article focuses on the crucial FrancoGerman relationship because it has been central to the evolution of the Euro since its inception, and argues that the historical, social and ideational conditions of German approaches to European integration and European Monetary Union (EMU) have shaped the limits of the politically possible for other European partners. Appreciation of these broader historical and structural conditions under which contemporary European governments make economic policy choices directs analytical attention towards different state traditions through which economic policy choices and constraints are refracted. It is these specific national social and ideational conditions which inform the distinct economic ideas about austerity, economic policy, and economic governance and regulation.
Understanding the political economy of European economic governance, and the politics of austerity in Europe since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, requires fine-grained appreciation of the economic ideas underpinning both French and German visions of European economic policy and the future European economic integration. It is against this backdrop that the analysis below delineates the positioning and policies of the Hollande presidency towards the architecture of the Euro, focusing in particular on fiscal policy dimensions and their recent evolutions. The analysis moves beyond the surface events of Hollande's policy initiatives to discern and explain underlying patterns and continuities between French Socialist economic policy under Hollande, Jospin and Mitterrand. In this light, Hollande's economic policy is a case of 'the more things change, the more they remain the same'.
Contemporary French economic policy is the latest iteration of a long-standing dilemma of trying to open a 'fiscal space' for growth-oriented policies from within European economic and monetary arrangements where key centres of power, notably the German Government, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank prioritise fiscal discipline and austerity. The dilemma is a long-standing one, going back to Mitterrand's famous U-turn of 1983, but the politico-economic effects are amplified by the magnitude of postfinancial crisis imbalances. Foremost amongst these is the large German balance of payments surplus which the IMF view as problematic, and belatedly even the European Commission recognise as requiring redress through measures to boost German domestic demand (European Commission 2013) .
Relating this dilemma to Franco-German bilateral relations draws attention to the potential for French agency, and how any French capacity to increase the fiscal space would depend on the Franco-German axis that has been so foundational for EU integration. Unfortunately for Hollande, the current conjuncture is not propitious, since a German sociopolitical consensus sees its strict ordo-liberal stance comprising anti-inflationary monetary policy and tight fiscal discipline as vindicated by the financial and Eurozone crisis. The German 'crisis of competitiveness' interpretation erroneously identifies the roots of the Eurozone crisis in every case as exclusively down to profligate governments having been insufficiently vigorous in their pursuit of supply-side structural economic reforms, hence Germany's insistence of one-sided adjustment by deficit countries as quid pro quo for initiatives such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Germany's reluctance to recognise that its trade surplus represents a problem, is arguably exacerbating the crisis and storing up problems of rising inequality for the German economy, and persistent mass unemployment and stagnation for 'Southern' Eurozone political economies (Stockhammer, 2011 (Stockhammer, , 2012 (Stockhammer, , 2014 Blyth, 2013; Scharpf 2013: 134) .
In the first section, we set out the broader problematique of advanced economy macroeconomic policy autonomy in a world characterised by international capital mobility. In light of this, section two considers the historical and ideational conditions of German approaches to EMU, which provides a necessary backdrop for understanding contemporary austerity politics in comparative perspective. We propose a set of crucial determinants of post-Bretton Woods political economy that condition the Eurozone, and spell out how these assign a pivotal role to Germany and balance of payment surpluses. Thereafter we delineate French strategy to try and move the German position by shifting the economic ideas and intellectual underpinnings of approaches European economic integration and EMU. We then in section four explore contemporary French economic policy under Hollande, before analysing Franco-German interactions in relation to the EU fiscal rules regime and the Fiscal Compact and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). In the final section, we highlight corrosive tendencies within German political economy, raising questions about whether the so-called economic powerhouse of Europe is in as healthy a condition as often assumed.
These corrosive tendencies may lead to a re-evaluation of Germany's European economic strategy. However, time is an important dimension in politics (Pierson 2004; Jessop, 2005) , and it is unlikely that glacial shifts in German political economy will evolve on a timescale helpful to Hollande. In the medium term, short of a truly cataclysmic collapse of the Eurozone, German policy is unlikely to change direction.
The Politics of Macroeconomic Policy under Conditions of Globalising Finance
This section explores the determinants of macroeconomic policy autonomy for advanced European economies in a post-Bretton Woods world characterised by heightened international capital mobility, as a necessary precursor to a fuller appreciation of the politics of economic policy under Hollande. A range of international political economy (IPE) scholarship has for many years sought to explain the constraints imposed on government economic policy autonomy by global financial markets, and to understand the degree of enduring room to manoeuvre. Such scholarship usually begins with mainstream macroeconomics and Marcus Fleming's (1962) and Robert Mundell's (1963) open-economy neo-Keynesian (IS-LM) formulation of the intrinsic incompatibility of exchange-rate stability, capital mobility, and national policy autonomy. The 'stringent logic' of this 'unholy trinity' imposes, according to Benjamin Cohen 'an increasingly stark trade-off on policymakers' which allegedly leads governments to eschew expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in favour of tight money and balanced budgets (Cohen 1993: 147 ; see also Oatley 1999 ). Cohen derived a broader politico-economic analysis when he subsequently argued that 'it is time to move beyond broad generalizations about the logic of the unholy trinity to more disaggregated analysis of the complex linkages between global finance and domestic performance (Cohen 1996: 283-4) . A crucial aspect of these 'complex linkages' is the degree of credibility economic policy settings enjoy with financial market participants. This is an important determinant of the nature and degree of enduring macroeconomic policy autonomy (or conversely the constraints thereon), and understanding it draws our gaze to the institutional and ideational context in which 'credibility' is constructed (Mosely 2003; Clift & Tomlinson 2004 .
The context of power relations within the wider world economy within which this process of credibility construction takes place is an important aspect affecting macroeconomic policy choices. In specifying what factors matter, and when for macroeconomic policymaking, we foreground how US hegemony structured the environment within which advanced European economies conduct macroeconomic policy in a post-Bretton Woods international monetary order of flexible exchange rates and liberalised financial markets. The United States, holding the world reserve currency and being at the centre of global financial transactions, was able to 'delay' and 'deflect' the need for domestic adjustments to expansionary policies (notably tax reductions and increased military expenditure) onto the rest of the world (Cohen 2006) .
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Randall Henning (1998) has demonstrated that European cooperation on fixed exchange rates and ultimately monetary union was motivated by no less than seven episodes of US macroeconomic policy having destabilizing consequences for European economies, with particular pressure on France and Germany being immediately relevant to outcomes.
The European nations sought protection which came in the form of cooperation over fixed exchange rates, but at the price of a reduced fiscal policy space. Since the participants were not in possession of the reserve currency, an alternative method of asserting autonomy and capabilities was devised, highly dependent on a system anchored in the capacity to accumulate surpluses and reserves. European monetary cooperation, from the European Monetary System (EMS) to the EMU, can thus be seen as a response to US hegemony, and a means to protect European economies and minimise the turbulence of the liberalised postBretton Woods international monetary order.
We explore here the particularities of European macroeconomic policy autonomy in the context of EMU, and the Eurozone crisis, noting that there are different ways to secure the aforementioned credibility. The particular sets of constraints imposed on advanced European economies in a post-Bretton Woods world are refracted through state traditions, ideational edifices which are built on specific social foundations. The deepening of European economic integration which culminated in the formation of EMU can be helpfully characterised as an 'Ordo-liberal' path to credibility could be pursued in the European context, by pegging to the Deutschmark and 'importing' German credibility -often initially at the cost of high interest rate premia, and restrictive fiscal policies (Clift 2003: 179-83; Dyson 1999; Ryner 2003: 204-6) . German monetary power dominates within EMU, in key locations such as the mandate of the ECB. Thus ordo-liberal notions of appropriate macroeconomic policy institutions and settings, prevalent in Germany and to some extent reflected in the ECB and European Commission, constitute the ideational parameters within which macroeconomic policy-makers have to operate.
The European approach to preserving economic policy autonomy and capabilities from the 1970s onwards favoured the most powerful export-economy of the bloc: Germany.
In other words, whilst such cooperation generated autonomy and capabilities -and in the case of the EMU even some mitigation of national balance of payments constraints (Jones 2003: 217-19 ) -it was autonomy of a particular sort and not always entirely commensurate with French conditions and aims. Mitterrand was initially sceptical about European monetary cooperation for this reason, but the repeated currency crises of 1982 and 1983 illustrated to him the costs of not having pan-European support against financial market turbulence (Muet & Fonteneau 1985; Lombard 1995; Halimi et al, 1994; Cameron, 1996) . Since then, France has sought to influence the parameters by participating in European arrangements and especially through its special bilateral relationship with Germany.
The European Context of French Austerity Politics: Patterns of Remarkable Continuity in German Political Economy and European Integration
Having established the international political economic context of post-Bretton Woods macroeconomic policy for advanced economies, this remainder of this article 'drills down' into these issues in the context of Franco-German relations within the process of European integration and EMU. It notes how the social and ideational sources of Germany's policy stance are important for understanding the conditions of French economic policymaking, and thus how Franco-German relations help explain austerity-centric macroeconomic policymaking in France in the wake of the Eurozone crisis.
We can only understand French fiscal policy settings under Hollande and the current approach to the management of the French economy and the Eurozone crisis if we first understand crucial continuities within European and German political economy. Given Germany's key structural power within the EU and especially within the Eurozone, the way Germany has approached European economic governance, and the economic ideas through which it has managed the process and sold it to domestic electoral constituencies crucially shape the limits of the politically possible for other European partners (Dyson & Featherstone 1999; Dyson 2013 (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 261-62, 287-88, 293-94, 320, 325-26) . Ordo-liberalism was formulated by a set of foundational German liberal thinkers, who against the backdrop of crises in the interwar Weimar Republic, concluded that market economies are not the products of natural propensities but rather must be publically constituted (Bonefeld 2012; Young 2011) . Indeed, the chief function of public sovereignty should be a rules-based system that produces such market constitution and any discretionary action that serves to undermine it is dangerous to social order and should be eschewed. Competition policy is a crucial domain for this public constitution of the market, and ordo-liberalism is highly influential on EU antitrust and competition policy (Gerber 1998 ).
Ordo-liberalism informs a powerful 'stability culture' within German Politics, which shapes how German elites approach domestic and European economic policy issues (Howarth & Rommerskirchen 2013) . Ordo-liberal strictures on macroeconomic policy favour fiscal conservatism and balanced budgets, and consider price stability as the public good that must be guaranteed (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 20) . It is perhaps no accident that Germany pioneered independent central banking. Ordo-liberal sound money anti-inflationary precepts regarding monetary policy, and the corollaries for fiscal policy, became central in Europe's monetary union. Ordo-liberals are particularly suspicious of the French dirigiste tradition of discretionary economic policy. From the EMS and onwards, monetary cooperation could proceed only on the condition that France and other members were effectively locked into a market-constitutional framework (Young 2011 ).
This ideational continuity helps explain the stability of Germany's stance, and the remarkable similarity between the original terms under which the Federal Republic agreed to the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 and contemporary German approaches to Eurozone crisis management. Before the late 1970s, Germany had been reticent about closer European monetary cooperation in the absence of close convergence on macroeconomic fundamentals. In line with so-called 'Coronation-Theory', monetary union would be the outcome of macroeconomic convergence. From the EMS onwards, however, Germany has been willing to take the lead in monetary cooperation provided that certain conditionalities, notably low inflation and fiscal balance are pursued (Scharpf 2013: 111-13) . This is in recognition that such cooperation can be a lever for convergence. Initially, in the EMS, financial markets served as the chief disciplinary mechanism in the fixed exchange rate area. Risk-premiums (higher interest rates) on the liabilities of states pursuing expansionary policies that were deemed likely to generate inflation rates higher than that of the German Mark counteracted the initial expansionary impulse.
When the launching of the Euro eliminated the option to exit out of one national currency into another, fiscal discipline had to be juridified. EMU has always raised concerns about potential fiscal indiscipline of powerful insiders (Eichengreen & Wyplosz 1998: 67- The substantive and procedural tightening is evident in the terms of the Fiscal Compact and the TSCG (European Council, 2012) . With it, the nominal deficit norm of 3 percent has been supplanted by a structural deficit norm which must not exceed a 0.5 percent/GDP.
When states exceed this norm, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) is activated. Since this currently includes most Eurozone member states, the EDP is of great formal significance.
The EDP requires states to enter 'Economic Partnership Programmes' (EPPs) with the EU, the objective of which is to devise an action plan to eliminate the excessive deficit. Notably, the remit of the EPP's is not restricted to macroeconomic policy but also includes 'structural policy'. Crucially, the EPP's are encoded in EU law, with all that that implies in terms of Crucial for German agreement to the EMS was that the German Mark would be the anchor currency in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and therefore Bundesbank ordoliberal policy dictated monetary policy for the EMS-zone as a whole. The risk premiums would serve as a disciplinary devise on member states tempted to pursue more expansionary macroeconomic policies with higher inflation rates. The standard macroeconomic IS-LM model, and the Mundell-Fleming impossibility theorem discussed above posits that fiscal policy autonomy is not possible in a world of fixed exchange rates and capital mobility. To the extent that the real conditions that obtain in international financial markets diverge from textbook conditions, we may expect limitations on the operation of the constraints on policy autonomy identified by the 'unholy trinity'. Nevertheless, the conditions that the Bundesbank forced through in negotiations over technical details of the EMS do reflect the MundellFleming impossibility theorem logic.
Key here, and a remnant of Coronation Theory, were conditionalities on EMS membership, limited credit facilities, limitations of the usage of Marks in the intervention, and limitations on the obligations on the Bundesbank to intervene (Dyson & Featherstone 1999 : 300-01 cf. Emminger 1975 . German veto over the usage of its accumulated reserves in the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was central to the whole construction from a German perspective. It allowed Germany to exercise structural power dictating the rules of the game through the potential of 'exit' -in the dual sense that it could potentially refuse to support other currencies under speculative attack and potentially force currencies out. This power of exit is, of course, lost in a monetary union and it explains the original Bundesbank resistance to the idea of EMU, as well as the importance assigned by Germany to the SGP and successor agreements, and to the non-lending clauses of the Maastricht Treaty.
This motivation can be found in the original agreement in 1979 and the particular politico-economic constellation that made Germany abandon its 'Coronationist' reticence and agree to the EMS. This constellation was reconstructed admirably by Lankowski (1982: 95-97) in Andrei Markovits' anthology The Political Economy of the German Model. The agreement was entered with Helmut Schmidt as the Chancellor of a coalition between the Social Democratic SPD and the Liberal FDP. The primary aim was to ensure price-stability at home, and a revaluation of the Mark in relation to dollar-denominated consumer-and industry-input imports (especially oil and other strategic raw materials). This benefited German export competitiveness because, on average, the costs of raw materials fell more than the rate of price increases for German exports. A second and intimately related aim was to prevent price competition to German exports by European competitors as a result of this revaluation;
Europe was the largest market outlet for German producers but not proportionally significant for industrial input imports. Turbulence arising from the depreciation of the US Dollar in 1978 served to augment Germany's motivations in this regard (Henning 1998: 557-58) .
Hence, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods, Germany abandoned its pre-Werner Report scepticism towards European monetary unification and took the lead in instituting the EMS. Other EMS members agreed to German conditions because of their interests in stabilising prices of their German-supplied investment goods. Internally, the revaluation reduced the costs for the import of consumer goods and made it possible for unions to deliver real social wage increases to its members whilst agreeing to restraint in wage increases as dictated by the export constraint. This included taking care of workers laid off by increased capital intensity through early retirement and other schemes that has been called Spaltungspolitik (Esser, Fach & Simonis 1980 ). Germany's approach to the EMS could be seen as the pursuit of 'Spaltungspolitik through other means' (Ryner 2003: 207) .
Consistent with the framework for analysis outlined above, it is crucial to understand the social foundations of Germany's European ordo-liberal economic policy stance. This focuses attention on the particularities through which German organised labour and social democracy was integrated into Germany's Christian Democratic welfare state accord (cf. van Kersbergen 1995), which was conclusively achieved during Schmidt's tenure as Chancellor.
Because of the continued central reproductive function performed by the patriarchial family, there has been less 'need' to finance an expansion of public sector services and employment, and less intra-union rivalry between the 'exposed' and (feminised) 'sheltered' sectors qua Scandinavian social democracy. While German unions favoured a more expansionary and proactive employment policy, after the peak of their power during the brief spell of Keynesianism during the period of the Brandt administration, they accommodated themselves to or-do-liberalism and higher unemployment under Schmidt. Unions have tried to influence wage policy, workplace organization, and terms of economic restructuring within this constraint.
This general pattern continued under the Kohl years (Esser 1982 (Esser , 1997 Streeck 1994 ).
In the 1980s, unions tried (with considerable success) to mitigate the pressure on unemployment increases through negotiations for worktime reduction and early retirement (Swenson 1989) . Wage equality and the overall wage-share as a proportion of GDP was maintained and even improved (Clayton & Pontusson 1998; Canry & Lechavalier 2006) .
Expansive wage policy served as a crucial channel in translating export orientation into the boost of internal aggregate demand through consumption growth (Allen & Markovits 1984; Swenson 1989 ). Policies pursued under Schröder and Merkel, such as the Agenda 2010, and the remaining consensus around the export oriented model, should be seen as the successful continuation of the Spaltungspolitik. In the face of increased global, financialised and postindustrial challenges, this now places more emphasis put on activation rather than early retirement and work-time reduction (Streeck 2009; Vitols 2004 ), although as we will see below, this strategy may be reaching its limits This 'long game' explains why actors such as Pierre Bérégovoy -to ensure credibility -took up more ordo-liberal stances than the ordo-liberals. It is against this backdrop that we should see Mitterrand's U-turn and France's active role in the consolidation of the EMS at the 1983 realignment of the ERM (Muet & Fonteneau 1985; Cameron 1996) . This French 'long game' has been a consistent feature of the European political economy since the 1980s (see e.g. Clift 2003 Clift , 2006 . Paradoxically, this served some French Ordo-liberal elites very well, as it allowed them to play an active role in construction of neoliberal multilateralism on the European and global level (Abdelal 2006 (Abdelal , 2007 . That said, some economic ideas and underlying assumptions built into France's multiyear planning, projections and forecasts which are central to its new fiscal policy institutions (Clift, 2013b) give cause for concern. The nuances of sequencing, and who bears the burden It is important to note that thinking on fiscal rules had evolved since the SGP with its 3% nominal deficit target which took no heed of the economic cycle and could potentially induce damagingly pro-cyclical policy. In recessions the public finances deteriorate, and this can require governments to pursue restrictive policies to meet nominal deficit targets at just the time in the economic cycle when fiscal stimulus is needed. The structural balance framework attempts to distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary elements of fiscal policy, excluding automatic stabilisers (defined as tax revenues and unemployment benefits according to the SGP) and the 'portion of spending and revenue over which legislators have no control' from assessment (Camdessus & Guidée 2010: 38) . Some officials and advisors report that selection of, and degree of emphasis on structural balance targets over nominal balance targets provoked debate with European policy elites, and disagreements between France and Germany. Germany accepts the merits of structural balance targeting, indeed the notion underpins its Schuldenbremse 'debt brake' introduced into the German constitution in 2009. However, it retains more attachment to nominal targets, partly because in the current conjuncture their policy corollary is a more steadfast commitment to fiscal consolidation. French authorities, supported by the IMF, argued for more emphasis on structural balance targets and downplaying the significance of the nominal targets still dear to Germany. France also sought to attenuate the automaticity of sanctions of fiscal indiscipline in the new Fiscal Compact.
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A perennial concern in French debates about balanced budget frameworks is their potentially pro-cyclical pathology. Choosing the 'structural balance' fiscal target as the lynch pin of the regime was designed to avoid excessive pro-cyclicality, and to require governments to build up fiscal buffers in good times. The Fiscal Compact, in avoiding nominal 3% deficit target and deploying a structural balance target, marks evolution from Maastricht in terms of understanding the fiscal policy/growth relationship. This tempers anti-Keynesian bias at the heart of the SGP. In the eyes of French policy elites who still harbour dirigiste activist fiscal policy aspirations, utilisation of a structural balance framework carves out a role for countercyclical fiscal policy, as well as sheltering automatic stabilisers from fiscal adjustment efforts. This, along with the slight attenuation of sanction automaticity in the form of the reverse qualified majority 8 represent (rather minor) victories for a French quasi-dirigiste approach within the new Fiscal Compact, insisting upon the potential role for countercyclical fiscal policy, and retaining some discretion over enforcement.
The structural balance is, however, a problematic target from an ordo-liberal perspective prioritising binding rules-bound macroeconomic policy regime. The structural balance is 'an estimate, not a firm number. It relies on computation of the output gap' (Camdessus & Guidée 2010: 38 
The Limits of German Power within EU Economic Governance: Corrosive Tendencies
Crucial to the prospects of French agency within the politics of austerity, then, is Germany's stance on the political economy of European economic governance. The French 'long game' sought to activate 'Russian dolls' in European agreements (Ross 1993; , to realise French Keynesian and dirigiste aspirations for substantive European 'economic government'. If successful, this could have led to a different political economic approach to the Eurozone's sluggish growth and high unemployment. Germany's capacity to veto has thus far locked in a primary focus on austerity at the European level. In this section we explore the foundations on which this veto power is based by 'kicking the tyres' of the German Ordo-liberal political economic settlement, understood here as a complex, composite, and potentially contradictory constellation (Ryner 2003) . The low growth rates were used as a motivation to advocate retrenchment in industrial relations and the welfare state. However, none of these reforms have boosted output or productivity growth. Rather, it seems that the anaemia lends itself to a Keynesian account emphasising the weakness of domestic demand: It has become increasingly difficult for German unions to pursue expansive wage policy, whereby they previously transmitted export-led growth to internal growth in consumption.
This makes Germany's export-oriented economy ever more dependent on external demandpull. Previously, within the structural coupling to other European economies in the EMS, the demand-pull of French 'profligacy' was the other side of the coin of German 'responsibility' (Deubner, Rehfeld & Schlupp 1992) . Paradoxically, macroeconomic convergence has corroded these relations to the detriment of German growth prospects. Prior to the Eurozone crisis, finance-led growth in the Eurozone periphery, fed by zero exchange rate risk, facilitated German export led growth and provided financial outlets for accumulated reserves.
It is very hard to see what will replace the southern Eurozone in that regard. The aggregated national action plans of the first 'Sixpack' fiscal semester indicates a Eurozone balance of payment surplus of 6 percent of Eurozone GDP to the rest of the world (Grahl 2013 ). Who will absorb that in the form of a deficit?
The German employment rate that has increased from about 65-68 percent from the 1960 through to the mid-1990s to over 75 percent in the 2010s (European Commission, 2012: These developments suggest that the complex, composite, and potentially contradictory constellation of German ordo-liberalism and the social market is becoming increasingly fragile. This makes the confident continuity in the German position on European economic policy all the more remarkable. Tensions within this German political economic settlement may have implications for Germany's hegemonic mass parties, whose success always has depended on hailing and bridging a broad range of constituents in composite electoral coalitions under the umbrella of the 'social market economy' (Schmid, 1998; Lösche & Walter 1992) . One indicator of this is the remarkable decline in recent years of the proportion of the electorate that vote for either of the two mass parties (Figure 3 ). This highlights the vulnerability that low growth rates posed for party capacity to engage in a 'politics of meditation' in Christian Democratic welfare states (van Kersbergen 1995) . 
Conclusion
Hollande's 2012 campaign was fought, somewhat anachronistically, on commitment to both a harsh fiscal consolidation and a re-orientation of economic policy in a more growthoriented direction. In office, such clarity of focus and purpose within French economic strategy as has been achieved has cohered around commitments to fiscal consolidation. The further public expenditure cuts programmed in over the full five years of Hollande's presidency within the medium-term budgetary programme process only makes the task of delivering French jobs and growth harder.
This article has explored dynamics and drivers which help explain this outcome, set in the context the comparative politics of austerity-oriented economic policies across Europe.
Growth-oriented macroeconomic policy has not been in evidence due to the limits on policy Lafontaine in the early days of the Schröder administration (Ryner, 2003) . German 'stability culture' is an enduring and powerful ideational force (Howarth & Rommerskirchen 2013) , and the consistency of the German position since 1979 should caution us from reading too much into the signs of corrosion. Indeed, so far predominant response to mass party corrosion has been the formation of 'Grand Coalitions' underpinned by an essential ordo-liberal consensus. In the absence of such a thorough-going re-evaluation of Germany's ordo-liberal and austerity-focused approach, the French Socialist government and President have been hamstrung in their aspirations to articulate an alternative vision for Eurozone crisis management, perhaps even an alternative model for European political economy.
